ASF Standards · Medical Transport · Standard 10

Standard 10 — Digital Care and Artificial Intelligence

3 criteria · 2 core · 1 standard-level · Version 1.0 · Aligned to ISQua EEA Principle 7, 6th Edition

Medical transport’s digital footprint is genuinely concentrated in dispatch and routing systems, not direct AI-assisted clinical interpretation. This standard is deliberately scoped to that real footprint, with three criteria rather than five.

Criteria in this standard

10.1 — Dispatch and Routing Systems Are Genuinely Evaluated for Reliability
10.2 — Patient Data Transmitted Electronically Is Genuinely Secure
10.3 — Route Optimisation Tools Never Override Genuine Clinical Judgement

10.1

Dispatch and Routing Systems Are Genuinely Evaluated for Reliability

Core

The dispatch and routing system is genuinely evaluated for reliability before and during use, with a real, functioning fallback when it fails — not a single point of failure that, if it goes down, genuinely leaves crews without a way to receive or respond to calls.

In plain terms: If the dispatch system goes down, crews still actually have a working way to get and respond to calls — not left stranded with no backup.

Facility category	Crisis	Transition	Small	Standard
Applicability	Adapted	Full	Full	Full

Why this matters

This is marked Core because dispatch system failure in a medical transport service has genuinely direct, real patient safety consequences — a crew unable to receive a call, or a patient unable to be reached, is a real, immediate harm risk unlike almost any other digital system failure in this sector. A genuine, tested fallback is what stands between a system outage and a real gap in patient care.

What good looks like

The dispatch system is genuinely evaluated for reliability.
A real, functioning fallback exists.
A real instance shows the fallback successfully used.

Common failure modes

A fallback plan exists on paper but has genuinely never been tested in practice.

Worked example

In practice

A service whose dispatch fallback had never been tested.

BeforeA backup radio communication plan existed on paper, but had genuinely never been tested during an actual dispatch system outage.

ActionA planned outage drill was conducted, genuinely testing the fallback under real conditions and surfacing a radio coverage gap in one area.

AfterThe Monitor reviewed the drill record and the resulting coverage fix. Verified.

If you are starting from zero — do this first

Conduct a planned dispatch outage drill to genuinely test your fallback.

The most common mistake: A fallback plan that exists on paper but has genuinely never been tested under real conditions.

Self-assessment questions

1. Is the dispatch system genuinely evaluated for reliability? — A real, documented evaluation.
Evidence: Reliability assessment

2. Is there a genuine, functioning fallback? — A real, usable backup.
Evidence: Fallback protocol

3. Is there a real instance of the fallback genuinely being used, successfully? — A concrete, real example.
Evidence: Drill or incident record

Common reasons for a PARTIAL answer

A fallback plan exists but has never genuinely been drilled or tested.

Implementation plan

When	What
Week 1-2	Document and schedule a genuine dispatch outage drill.

How the Monitor verifies this

Method	What	Detail
DOCUMENT	Drill record review	Reviews the drill record and evidence the fallback genuinely worked.

Supervisor tips

Ask crew directly what they would actually do if dispatch went down right now.

Evidence base

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Emergency Medical Services Communications. Washington DC: NHTSA; 2022.

ASF training courses on GMJ Academy →

Foundation courses A-00 to A-03 are live. Criterion-specific modules are being developed and will link here when published.

10.2

Patient Data Transmitted Electronically Is Genuinely Secure

Core

Patient data transmitted electronically between the vehicle, dispatch, and the receiving facility is genuinely secure — not sent over an unsecured channel on the assumption that the urgency of transport makes security a secondary concern.

In plain terms: Patient information sent between the vehicle, dispatch, and the hospital is actually secure — urgency never becomes an excuse to skip real data protection.

Facility category	Crisis	Transition	Small	Standard
Applicability	Adapted	Full	Full	Full

Why this matters

This is marked Core because patient confidentiality is a real, legal and ethical obligation that doesn’t genuinely lessen simply because transport is urgent — and the mobile, on-the-road nature of data transmission in this setting genuinely creates distinct security considerations (unsecured public networks, lost devices) that deserve specific, real attention rather than an assumption that urgency excuses the gap.

What good looks like

Data transmission is genuinely secure.
Crew are genuinely trained on mobile-specific secure handling.
A genuine reporting process exists for a suspected issue.

Common failure modes

Patient data is sent over an unsecured public network or personal messaging app “because it’s faster.”

Worked example

In practice

A service whose crew sometimes used personal messaging apps for speed.

BeforeIn urgent situations, crew sometimes sent patient details via personal messaging apps as a genuinely faster alternative to the official, secure channel.

ActionA genuinely faster, secure mobile handover tool was introduced and crew were specifically trained on using it under time pressure.

AfterThe Monitor confirmed the secure tool was genuinely in use, including under urgent conditions. Verified.

If you are starting from zero — do this first

Confirm your secure data transmission tool is genuinely fast enough for urgent use, or crew will bypass it.

The most common mistake: Treating urgency as a genuine reason to bypass secure channels in favour of faster, unsecured alternatives.

Self-assessment questions

1. Is patient data transmitted electronically genuinely secure? — Real, verified security.
Evidence: Security protocol

2. Is crew genuinely trained on secure data handling for mobile transmission? — Real, setting-specific training.
Evidence: Training record

3. Is there a genuine process for reporting a suspected security issue? — A real, usable reporting pathway.
Evidence: Reporting protocol

Common reasons for a PARTIAL answer

A secure channel exists but crew genuinely bypass it when under time pressure.

Implementation plan

When	What
Week 1-2	Confirm the secure channel is genuinely usable under time pressure and train crew.

How the Monitor verifies this

Method	What	Detail
ASK	Crew interview	Asks crew what they actually use to transmit patient data under time pressure.

Supervisor tips

Ask crew honestly whether they’ve ever used an unofficial channel “just this once.”

Evidence base

European Union. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 32: Security of Processing. Brussels: European Union; 2016.

ASF training courses on GMJ Academy →

Foundation courses A-00 to A-03 are live. Criterion-specific modules are being developed and will link here when published.

10.3

Route Optimisation Tools Never Override Genuine Clinical Judgement

Standard

Where route optimisation or AI-assisted dispatch tools are used, crew and dispatch staff genuinely retain the authority to override a suggested route or decision based on real clinical or situational judgement — not a tool’s output treated as binding regardless of real, on-the-ground circumstances the tool cannot see.

In plain terms: Crew and dispatch can actually override a route-planning tool’s suggestion when real, on-the-ground circumstances call for it — the tool never has the final say.

Facility category	Crisis	Transition	Small	Standard
Applicability	Adapted	Full	Full	Full

Why this matters

A route optimisation tool genuinely cannot see real, on-the-ground circumstances — a road closure it hasn’t registered, a patient’s real deteriorating condition changing the genuine urgency — and crew and dispatch staff need real, functioning authority to override its suggestion when their own judgement genuinely says otherwise.

What good looks like

Crew and dispatch can genuinely override the tool.
Staff are genuinely aware of this authority.
A real instance shows a genuine override.

Common failure modes

Staff follow the tool’s suggestion by habit, genuinely unaware they have override authority.

Worked example

In practice

A dispatcher following a route tool’s suggestion despite known real conditions.

BeforeStaff genuinely believed the suggested route had to be followed, even when they personally knew of a closure the tool hadn’t registered.

ActionStaff were explicitly, genuinely briefed on their override authority, with a real example demonstrated during training.

AfterThe Monitor interviewed staff who could clearly describe their genuine override authority. Verified.

If you are starting from zero — do this first

Explicitly brief crew and dispatch staff on their genuine override authority, with a real example.

The most common mistake: Staff genuinely unaware they have override authority, following a tool’s suggestion out of habit even when they know better.

Self-assessment questions

1. Can crew and dispatch genuinely override a tool’s suggestion? — A real, functioning override.
Evidence: Override policy

2. Are staff genuinely aware of this authority? — Real, demonstrated understanding.
Evidence: Staff interview

3. Is there a real instance of a genuine override? — A concrete, real example.
Evidence: Override record

Common reasons for a PARTIAL answer

Override authority exists in policy but staff genuinely don’t know it or feel empowered to use it.

Implementation plan

When	What
Week 1-2	Brief all crew and dispatch staff explicitly on override authority.

How the Monitor verifies this

Method	What	Detail
ASK	Staff interview	Asks staff whether they would override the tool, and under what circumstances.

Supervisor tips

Ask a dispatcher directly: “Can you ignore the tool’s suggested route? When would you?”

Evidence base

European Commission. Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence. Brussels: European Commission; 2019.

ASF training courses on GMJ Academy →

Foundation courses A-00 to A-03 are live. Criterion-specific modules are being developed and will link here when published.

← Medical Transport Standards — all standards
← Standard 9 — Sustainable Care
Standard 11 — Supporting the Care Workforce →